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CHINA'S SECOND REVOLUTION: REFORM AFTER MAO.
By Harry Harding. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987. Lib. Cong. No. HC 427.92.H37. US$32.95.
Reviewed by Xi-Qing Gao*
Having come from China, I often hear people complain
about the lack of intellectual, unbiased, and profound accounts
of present-day China. These complaints are not unwarranted,
as the past ten years of changes in China have been so dramatic, so fundamental, and so unpredictable that only the
word "revolution" can fully describe their nature. Deng Xiaoping knew, in his wisdom and foresight, that the reforms into
which he was leading China were in every respect comparable
to the first revolution into which Mao led the nation. Daily
happenings in China have proven that Harry Harding's book,
entitled China's Second Revolution, is aptly named.
China's Second Revolution was meant to be a comprehensive
study of China's ongoing reforms (p. 2). It has completed this
task admirably. The book was also meant to offer a prospective picture of the reforms-where they are going and how. In
this latter task, Harding, like most dialectical writers, takes a
safe course. He has made many conclusions, to be sure. Every
one of them, however, is accompanied by provisos and caveats
that provide the author an easy escape in case his prophecy is
not fulfilled.
Harding has a thorough grasp of dialecticism. As much as
most self-proclaimed Marxists believe in material dialecticism,
* Associate, Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon, New York, New York;
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1978, Beijing Institute of
Foreign Trade; LL.M. 1981, University of International Business and Economics;J.D.
1986, Duke University. Mr. Gao is the first citizen of the People's Republic of China
to pass the New York State Bar Exam.
1. Material dialecticism is the methodological component of dialectical materialism, which is the acclaimed theoretical foundation for communism in most communist countries. It holds that everything in the universe has a material basis, and is in a
state of continuous movement and change-a result of contradictions and struggles
inherent in the thing itself. At the core of material dialecticism is the law of unity of
opposites, which is described as a process of change in which a concept or its realization passes over into and is preserved and fulfilled by its opposite. The law of unity
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many never truly understand it, much less practice it. Harding's book, in contrast, "shines with dialecticism," as Chairman Mao used to say in praise of certain writers or articles. It
is not imperative that one believe in Marxism to utilize dialecticism, say the Party propagandists, because dialectical materialism is an objective truth and people use it consciously or subconsciously. When predicting the future of a nation becomes a
science, as is the case here, a true scholar will invariably take all
factors into consideration, thus making it difficult to render a
definitive conclusion.
The most impressive achievement of this book is its indepth analysis of the problems, achievements, valued experiences, and bitter lessons in the past ten years of China's reforms. Many people have tried to provide an objective picture
of China from various angles. Some have succeeded in exploring a glimpse of the giant myth by, as the Chinese idiom goes,
"getting to know the cheetah by looking at one of its spots."
That may be one way to learn the truth, but many people still
prefer to see the whole picture when it comes to knowing a
nation. Harding's book provides that whole picture.
Like any epoch-making event in history, the Cultural
Revolution inevitably stands out as one of the relevant factors
in any discussion of the era succeeding it. It is a clich6 to say
that it was a disastrous or catastrophic period of time for the
Chinese nation. And it became the fashion for people to dismiss it as the result of Mao's effort to destroy his personal enemies within the Party. Harding, however, approaches these issues in a very scholarly way. Despite his statement that the
book is not intended to be a comprehensivepolitical history of
modern China (p. 2), Harding nonetheless gives an objective
and well-balanced, though brief, account of the Cultural
Revolution (ch. 2). He explores the more important concerns
of Mao in designing and charging through with the Cultural
Revolution: the ideal of egalitarianism, economic or political,
epitomized in the so-called "combination of Marxist truth and
the concrete situation of the Chinese revolution" (pp. 18, 26);
the need to fight against, in Mao's words, "a vast ocean of petty
bourgeoisie" existing in China and threatening to drown the
of opposites was popularized by Mao Ze-Dong in his famous proposition that "Everything divides into two."
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revolutionary regime (p. 26); the concept of a self-reliant enclosed economic system, which Harding calls an autarkic cellular economy (pp. 18-19); and the sense of an ever-continuing
revolution that would effectively lead people to rise above their
own selfishness (pp. 26-27). As a former Red Guard with all
those years of indoctrination, or "brainwashing," and the ensuing disillusionment, I take genuine pleasure in reading these
accounts of that particular period of time in history. That,
however, does not mean that I was also "angered" at the prospect of permanent exile in the countryside, as described by the
author (p. 37). With painstaking efforts, the author accumulated statistics to show that the Cultural Revolution was not all
negative even in regard to the national economy (p. 30). By
the end of the 1970s, the Chinese people, although poor in
monetary income, enjoyed a standard of living far above what
might have been expected for a country at China's level of development (pp. 30-31). It is important to realize that this standard came about largely as a result of the enthusiasm exemplified, the hardship endured, the devotion given, and the sacrifices ,made by millions of people in those years. By realizing
this, it is easier to understand more recent happenings: the indifference shown by the people not only toward Marxist-Leninist theories, but even toward their constitutionally guaranteed
right to vote for representatives of the People's Congress; the
general ill humor displayed toward any decline in their standard of living; and the corruption that has become the biggest
social evil of all in the people's eyes.
In a sense, the Cultural Revolution heralded the beginning of the second revolution, which would eventually break
the feudalistic shackles gripping the minds of the Chinese people for thousands of years. The first revolution claimed as its
goals, first, the liberation of the masses from both the physical
sufferings of hunger and cold, and second, the liberation from
the spiritual sufferings of ignorance and subservience. The
first goal has, as noted in the book, by and large been reached
(p. 30). The second goal, however, can be reached only after
much more arduous and persistent efforts and probably after a
much longer period of time. Today's China has no role models to follow, as it did in the 1920s and the 1950s (p. 3). As
correctly pointed out by the author, while China is seeking out
its own course in the voyage toward modernization, China is
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not going to make a full swing to a Western-style market economy or a truly pluralistic society (p. 264); neither is it going to
move towards orthodox socialism (p. 130). The issue is, in the
author's words, to select the blend that will be most appropriate to China's circumstances (p. 130). With that belief in mind,
therefore, the author does not lose sight of the main current of
the Chinese political institution even amidst the myriad of reports and data about the changing direction in China. When
many China observers are extolling what they think of as
China's repudiation of Marxism-Leninism, the author clearheadedly writes that, despite the Party's willingness to allow,
and even encourage, some creativity in the interpretation of
Marxism, it still does not tolerate the active presentation of any
ideological alternative (pp. 173, 182, 186).
The issue here is, however, whether it is so bad for China
to remain a largely self-sufficient and, more importantly, a
non-pluralistic society. The author does not seem to try to
make a value judgment here. The words he uses, however, do
carry a moral tone. "Consultative authoritarianism," ' the term
borrowed by the author to characterize the present Chinese regime (p. 200), is something undesirable to most Americans
when compared with their more favored terms, such as "democracy" or "pluralism." The same is true with concepts such
as "rule by man" and "rule by law," which the author tries to
expound in Max Weber's terms (p. 184). In a Western society,
people presume that rule by law, or "rational legal authority,"
is superior to rule by man, or "charismatic authority," and that
pluralism is better than authoritarianism. These ideals are best
personified in the legal and political institutions of the United
States.
Chinese society, however, does not necessarily share these
beliefs. It is becoming common knowledge that an Eastern society places more emphasis on consensus-building rather than
on adversariness, on community interests rather than on individualism, and on cultural and societal persuasion rather than
on formal prosecution. Even Japan, one of the most developed capitalist countries in the world, cannot escape these
Eastern values. In a sense, the kind of permeating control in
2. Harding borrows the term from Skilling, Group Conflict and Political Change, in
CHANGE IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS 215-34 (C. Johnson ed. 1970).
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China so antipathetic to a Western mind may conversely serve
as an effective channel for the rank and file to be heard by the
highest rulers (p. 26). Should China rush into the modern,
Western style-that of a democratic, pluralistic society ruled by
law-a system that may not be the single best available form of
government for the nation? Plato may have been utopian in
his hopes for philosopher kings, but can we not see the rationale in his ranking the rule of law as second best-the best being the rule of a true statesman in a lawless society?3 The present leaders of China may be far from being the kind of statesmen ,Plato described, but China is not a totally lawless society
either. As a group, a politburo or a cabinet may very well become, probably sometime in the future, a statesman in plural
form. Why would that happen instead of it degenerating into a
totalitarian regime? One can only try to take comfort in the
thought that Marxism is an open-ended system. It does not
claim to be perfect and it is always willing to adapt itself to the
concrete conditions of human society. What is happening today in China, in the Soviet Union, and in most of the other
socialist countries where Marxism is still claimed to be the official ideology, may just be testaments to that thought. Harding
obviously does not take this view, although he acknowledges
the prevalence of the view among Chinese intellectuals (p.
201).
In Part I, which stresses the origins of reform, Harding
makes some prescient predictions, which have been validated
by recent happenings. As much as he is cautiously optimistic
about the future of the reforms, he believes that the dismissal
of Hu Yaobang, a conservative, in early 1987 raised the possibility that younger representatives with moderate political
leanings might secure appointment to leading Party bodies at
the Thirteenth Party Congress in the fall of 1987 (p. 86). So it
happened. Harding's prediction, however, does not preclude
his generally optimistic view towards the future of the reforms
(pp. 297-303).
More penetrating analyses are made in Part II about the
contents of the reforms and Part III about the future of reform.
When addressing problems associated with the agricultural reforms, the author gives much attention to the lack of long-term
3. PLATO, STATESMAN 293a et seq., 297c et seq.
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capital investment from either the state or the peasants (p.
107). This indeed has become such a serious problem that the
advances made in agricultural reform may to a large extent be
eradicated in the years to come. Regarding the administrative
controls over the economy, the author points out the lack of
adequately developed, truly effective regulatory devices to replace the old system that had already been relaxed (p. 113).
The much hailed trend of decentralization may, as the author
sees it, run counter to the spirit of economic reform, in that it
would give greater authority to local agencies that have both
the desire and the capability to interfere directly in the operation of the marketplace (p. 227). Domestically, the author sees
a major source of resistance to reform, what many analysts
have described as the implicit social contract between state and
society in a communist system: the denial of certain economic
and political freedoms in exchange for the supply of the
staples of life at low prices (p. 293). Indeed, some believe that
the working class may become the most reactionary force toward the reforms, which may very well result in price increases
in staples of life and decrease in job security.4 Internationally,
the author makes sensible comparisons between pre-Mao and
post-Mao China (pp. 239-41), and gives credit to China's increasingly more pragmatic, less ideologically charged diplomatic policies (pp. 243, 244). Economically, the author views
China's entry into the world economy as having already been
accommodated by the system, and, therefore, its future growth
should not be conceived as posing any major threat to the
global economic system (p. 251). Geopolitically, a stronger,
wealthier, and thus more secure China should become a stabilizing rather than a disturbing factor in the Asian-Pacific Rim
(pp. 239-41, 268). The author, however, almost seems to relish the suggestion that the best scenario for China is a nation
ever striving to achieve modernization but never succeeding
(p. 246). Let's hope that this is only American-style humor,
even though the relevant remarks were originally made by a
Japanese sinologist.
There are always, of course, things that can be improved
in a book of this scope; after all, it is much easier to write a
4. Liu Yuan, Speech to China Business Association at Columbia University (Nov.
21, 1987), reprinted in 2 Bus. BRIDGE 10 (1988).
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book review than to write the book itself. First, one may disagree with a few of the historical accounts in the book. For example, the author's attribution of China's autarkic policy during most of the thirty-year period after 1949 to Mao's egalitarianism does not present the whole picture of the time. The
U.S.-led trade embargo in the 1950s and the Soviet Union's
withdrawal of all assistance in the 1960s, the realistic fear of
famine and war in a perceived hostile environment, and, to a
lesser degree, the desire to set an example in the "world
revolution," all provided much stronger reasons for China to
be self-sufficient. On a related point, the author analogizes
China's foreign economic policy to that of many other East
Asian countries: a neomercantilist strategy aimed at promoting foreign economic relationships that will help produce a relatively self-reliant nation. A recent talk by Zhao Ziyang, the
General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, reveals
that China's highest leaders no longer require enterprises to
strive for total domestication of all their products.5 This symbolic gesture at least shows the degree of a long-term commitment by the present leaders to an open-door policy. In his account of the struggle between the restorationists and the reformers, the author seems to place much emphasis on Deng
Xiaoping's personal feelings towards Hua Guofeng and his
policies (pp. 57, 58, 63). To most Chinese during that period,
however, objective factors play a much more important role in
that struggle. It was the true political and economic necessity
of the country at the time and the genuine feelings of the
whole Party and the whole nation that eventually brought
Deng back to, and Hua down from, power.
Although the author appears to be cautiously optimistic
about the future of the reforms in many respects, he nonetheless errs on the side of conservatism in portraying the opportunities for popular participation (p. 180). Since the time this
book went to print, competitive elections have become a norm
in practically all levels of the government and the Party. Even
some of the highest-level Party officials were voted out of the
Central Committee at the Thirteenth Party Congress, despite
the Politburo's original intentions.
One would also like to see a more exhaustive examination
5. People's Daily, Feb. 10, 1988.
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of the question of ownership, which is probably one of the
most important issues in the reforms. The author does devote
a whole section to the ownership question (pp. 124-28), but
never really spells out its relevance. The trend in China today
is clearly toward a much more diversified economic system in
which several different forms of ownership coexist. One can
easily note that trend from the daily increase in the number of
state-sponsored foreign private enterprises and government
encouraged domestic private enterprises; 6 from the Party General Secretary's endorsing a private sector that may take up
one third to one half of the national economy; from the establishment of stock markets in some major cities and the sale of
equity shares of a few large state-owned enterprises to private
citizens (p. 123); 7 from the privatization of some of the banking business-the single most tightly controlled business in
any socialist economy;' and from a majority of the state-owned
enterprises in the process of being leased/contracted out to
individual managers. 9 Clearly, the original idea of "socialist
public ownership of the means of production"' 0 may no longer
be predominant, and the Party theorists have to reinterpret the
so-called "fundamental theories" and admit either that Marx
and Lenin were wrong in establishing their theories or that the
Party was wrong in interpreting the Forefathers. In fact, the
Constitution has been recently amended to allow private ownership and transfer of land use rights."
Theoretical differences aside, the question of ownership
has already presented a slew of paradoxes for the reformers.
Paradox No. 1: if the factory is contracted out to the manager,
who bears a much bigger risk of its economic viability than the
workers and who has the right to hire and fire workers, then
are workers still the "masters" of their factory, as they have
been told during the past thirty some years, or are they just
laborers hired by the contracting manager? In some cases, the
6. See, e.g., People's Daily, Overseas Ed., Mar. 16, 1988; People's Daily, Overseas
Ed., Mar. 15, 1988.
7. People's Daily, Nov. 22, 1986; People's Daily, Nov. 15, 1986; N.Y. Times,
Nov. 12, 1986; People's Daily, Nov. 12, 1986; People's Daily, Nov. 11, 1986.
8. Gao, China's FinancialReform, 2 Bus. BRIDGE 8 (1988); China Daily News, Dec.
29, 1987, at 10, col. 1.
9. People's Daily, Mar. 14, 1988; China Daily News, Jan. 28, 1988.
10. CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 6.
11. People's Daily, Apr. 13, 1988.
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workers are allowed to elect the managers, but that seems to
run counter to the whole idea of modern management and also
seems to alleviate the economic pressure on the elected managers. Paradox No. 2: if the state-owned enterprises are allowed to go bankrupt, as contemplated by the pending Bankruptcy Law and as demonstrated by a few examples in the experimental cities,' 2 then would-the state go bankrupt as well?
Apparently not, even though it still imposes much of the bureaucratic power upon the enterprise in terms of setting prices
of input unreasonably high and of output unreasonably low (p.
285). If that is the case, the only logical bankrupt owners of
the factory would then be the manager and the workers. Here
the workers become the "masters" of their own factory again,
but only to bear its losses. Paradox No. 3: for years people
have been told that the fundamental contradiction of a capitalist society is the one between large-scale socialization of production and an ever more concentrated privatization of the
means of production. Hence there are the ever-deepening cyclical economic crises, the ever-widening gap between the rich
and the poor, and the ever-increasing distance between the cities and the countryside. Now that China is poised to accept so
much of private ownership, is it going to suffer the same kind
of consequences inherent in the aforementioned contradictions? Or can China, because it is still by and large a socialist
country, somehow be immune from these capitalist diseases?
Harding seems to believe in the former scenario without admitting that it is caused by the introduction of capitalism. He
maintains that serious problems, including economic inequality and political dissent, as well as corruption, inflation, trade
deficits, imbalanced budgets, shortfalls in grain production,
and a growing perception of a decline in moral values, may be
the product of the contradictions that are inherent in China's
attempt to create a mixture of a planned economy and a market economy, and liberalization and control (pp. 273-74, 28384).
It is somewhat puzzling that the important role to be
played by education in the coming years of reform is not ad12. China Daily, Dec. 3, 1986; People's Daily, Dec. 3, 1986; People's Daily, Nov.
10, 1986; People's Daily, Nov. 6, 1986; People's Daily, Sept. 6, 1986; People's Daily,
Sept. 5, 1986; People's Daily, Aug. 30, 1986; People's Daily, Aug. 11, 1986.
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dressed in this book. Propaganda work has always been one of
the most important aspects of a communist revolution. The
first revolution in China is filled with examples of mobilizing
the masses with revolutionary slogans and theories. The
heightened class consciousness effectively guaranteed that the
revolution would be carried to the end. The education we are
concerned about here, however, is almost the antithesis of the
ideologically-charged propaganda characteristic of the first
revolution. If the second revolution is to succeed, an independent intellectual class comparable to the large educated
middle class of the West is almost certainly a prerequisite. The
author speculates on the possibility of the emergence of a Chinese middle class, but he does not seem to link that directly to
the education of the new generation (p. 296). The author expounds upon the most sweeping totalitarian rule of all times by
the Communist government, but he seems to attribute the effectiveness only to modern transportation and communications rather than to a largely illiterate or quasi-illiterate constituency that had never been enlightened by the concepts of
modem democracy and basic human rights (pp. 24-26). The
author also comments on the adage that enthusiasm for the
reform process is "hot at both ends but cold in the middle" (p.
290), and talks favorably about the restaffing of the Party and
state bureaucracies (pp. 204-09), but he associates this phenomenon mostly with ideologically conservative, mid-level bureaucrats trying hard to protect their own turf (p. 291) rather
than with the added fact that the level of education in this
group has been so low that the average member simply does
not understand new ideas, let alone is willing to accept these
ideas for change. The author even delineates the stratification
of the Chinese intellectuals in his elaborate efforts to portray
the popular mood. But he stops short of giving these people a
more important role to play in the future of the reforms (p.
294).
In the final analysis what, in my view, gives one some confidence in the future of the reforms is a much better-educated
nation, as shown by the recent rapid increase in the percentage
of college entrants and graduates and a much heightened and
truly permeating national consciousness of education. The author expresses his pessimism at the low level of popular participation and the seemingly unsuccessful effort of the Party to

914 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA W JOURNAL
streamline the bureaucracies (pp. 181, 210). What happened
during the Thirteenth Party Congress, however, gives one
much comfort in dispelling Harding's skepticism and in hoping
for the best-case scenarios presented in the book. After all,
many of what Harding classified as radical predictions have already been or are in the process of being realized, and many
others seem to have better chances now. For example, the
phenomenon of what Harding calls "stockification" (p. 126) is
no longer a rarity and a target of fierce criticisms. Neither are
the competitive elections for Party leaders a sporadic happening (p. 181). Four of the six members of the Standing Committee, the inner-most circle of the Party leadership, are in
their fifties and have college degrees; the remaining two are in
their early sixties. Even Hu Yaobang, the then-dismissed Party
General Secretary, is coming back, having been elected again
to the Politburo (p. 229). Today's China is no longer the one
that froze each time the Great Chairman sneezed. Neither is it
the one that jumped at any sign of a perceived threat. China
has matured greatly in the past ten years by learning from its
own mistakes, and it is continuing that learning process. To
borrow a quotation from Lenin: people learn much more in a
week of revolution than they would otherwise learn in a whole
year of routine life. China's second revolution may or may not
be the kind of revolution Lenin would have wanted to see.
Nevertheless, its educational effects will be felt in the many decades to come.
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